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SUMMARY
In some situations, a user would like to communicate without detection. It has been
shown that it is impossible to achieve positive rate while remaining undetectable to a third
party. However, that work assumes that the detector is certain about their own noise power,
which inherently has uncertainty because that knowledge is based on a measurement. By
exploiting this uncertainty the transmitter can achieve a positive rate while remaining un-
detectable to a third party. This positive rate is quantified in numerous scenarios: Single
Input Single Output (SISO) Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) and Rayleigh chan-
nels (with channel state information (CSI) and channel distribution information (CDI)), and
Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) Rayleigh channels. Finally, building on previous
work, it is shown that for a detector to lower their maximum possibility of an error, they
should not take as many samples as possible–a counterintuitive result. This is explained in




1.1 Motivation and Background
In wireless communications there are situations where a user would want to communicate
such that his emissions are undetectable to other users—that is, transmit with privacy. One
emerging example is underlay cognitive radio (CR) [1], where a secondary user seeks to
communicate with such low power as to not interfere with or be detected by primary users.
Another example is secure communications where a wireless user does not want to reveal
his presence in the spectrum to an eavesdropper. Many attacks on wireless networks are
predicated on an attacker’s ability to determine that a target is transmitting [2, 3]. By
transmitting with sufficiently low power we can avoid potential network attacks and also
politely use the spectrum in the presence of primary users. In this thesis we determine
the achievable communications rate afforded by the privacy constraint under a variety of
eavesdropper and channel assumptions.
To formalize our objective, consider a scenario where two users, Alice and Bob, would
like to communicate over a wireless channel without being detected by a detector, Dave.
Dave’s objective is not to decode Alice’s transmissions, but merely to detect the presence
of Alice’s transmissions. If Alice does not want to reveal her position or even her existence,
encrypting her communications is not enough. Bash, Goeckel, and Towsley found that if
Alice knows a lower bound of Dave’s noise power, O(
√
N) bits can be sent in N channel
uses while guaranteeing that Dave’s sum of probability of false alarm PFA and missed
detection PMD is asymptotically arbitrarily close to one [4].
To make this more clear, we define two terms. I(N), which behaves as O(
√
N), is
the number of undetected error-free bits that can be sent in N channel uses. Likewise,
Cpr = limN→∞ I(N)/N is the error-free privacy channel capacity. The result in [4] means
that Cpr = 0 in Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channels. While the asymptotic
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rate is zero, this does not mean no information can be communicated—I(N) is positive so
long as the probability of detection is nonzero. Bash, Goeckel, and Towsley’s work is the
first work that we are aware of that puts information theoretic bounds on low probability of
detection communication.
The square root law found in [4] relates to problems in steganography where a fixed-
size, finite-alphabet covertext object can be changed to hide a message. Because the cover-
text object is transmitted noiselessly in steganography, O(
√
N log N) bits can be transmitted
by modifying O(
√
N) symbols in covertext of size N [5, Ch. 8, Ch. 13]. If we put this in
information theory terms of rate over a channel, where covertext of size N is analogous
to N channel uses, this is still asymptotically zero rate despite the noiseless transmission
because limN→∞O(
√
N log N)/O(N) = 0.
However, it is possible to achieve a positive rate when we assume that Dave is uncer-
tain of his noise level and uses a radiometer (energy detector) as his detection test. This
improves upon the AWGN case with noise power certainty, where positive privacy rate
is not possible with a radiometer detector. However, it is important to note that while a
radiometer is the optimal detector for AWGN systems where Dave knows his noise vari-
ance, a radiometer is not optimal when Dave does not know his noise variance [6]. Thus,
the result we present is not as strong as the one in [4], but our result does demonstrate
that in practical situations, a positive rate is possible while still guaranteeing that Dave’s
PMD + PFA → 1.
It is important to distinguish privacy capacity from secrecy capacity, which is the max-
imum error free rate that Alice can talk to Bob, while preventing an eavesdropper from
decoding Alice’s transmissions. The constraints of privacy and secrecy, while different, do
not actually supersede one another [7].
In this thesis we delve into greater detail the notion of an SNR wall [4], and how Alice
can use it to her advantage to communicate without being detected. We also try to estimate
what kinds of uncertainty we can reasonably expect and the resultant communication rates
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that Alice and Bob can achieve over Single Input-Single Output (SISO) and Multiple Input-
Multiple Output (MIMO) AWGN and Rayleigh channels. We use several assumptions of
channel information: channel state information (CSI) on the Alice-Bob and Alice-Dave
channels and CSI on the Alice-Bob channel and channel distribution information (CDI) on
the Alice-Dave channel.
1.2 Privacy Capacity
Privacy capacity involves three parties: a transmitter, receiver, and detector. It is dependent
not only on the transmitter’s choice of coding scheme, but also the detector’s detection
scheme.
1.2.1 System Setup
Consider the communications scenario in Figure 1 where Alice transmits a circularly sym-
metric Gaussian signal s[n], where n is the time index, with mean 0 and variance Γs. Bob
is her intended receiver, and Dave is a passive detector. Dave is trying to determine Alice’s
presence–whether or not she is transmitting. Finally, Bob and Dave experience circularly
















Figure 1: System block diagram.
When a random variable X has a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution
with mean µ and variance Γ it is denoted as X ∼ CN(µ,Γ). Bob and Dave are located
distances rr and rd from Alice, respectively. All of our signals s[n], r[n], and d[n], are
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mutually independent. We assume the received signal power, P, is a scaled monomial
function of the distance, which is consistent with the free space path loss model where
P ∝ 1/r2 [8, p. 107], as well as multipath path loss models, where P ∝ 1/rα with α, the
path loss exponent, as low as 1.2 and as high as 6.2 [9]. We will let P = ψ/rα for some
proportionality constant ψ. The uncertainty in Dave’s noise power measurement is given
by Γ̂d ∈ [A, B], where Γd is the true noise power. As discussed in Chapter 5, one source of
Dave’s noise uncertainty Alice can expect and put reasonable bounds on is thermal noise.
This is something she can estimate without any knowledge of her channel to Dave.
1.2.2 Detection Metrics
To define privacy capacity, we assume that Dave is trying to distinguish between the fol-
lowing two signal hypotheses,
H0 : x[n] = d[n], (1)




s[n] + d[n], (2)
with n ∈ {1, ...,N} and associated probability distributions P0(x) and P1(x), respectively.
The privacy capacity Cpr is defined as the maximum error free rate at which Alice can
talk to Bob, while guaranteeing that Dave’s sum of probabilities of detection errors is ϵ
close to one—that is,
ξ = PMD + PFA > 1 − ϵ, (3)
where PMD is the probability of missed detection and PFA is the probability of false alarm
for some arbitrarily small ϵ.
It is not immediately obvious that ξ being close to one should be our objective. We
are adding two probabilities, which normally results in a value bounded between 0 and 2.
However, PFA+PMD = PFA+1−PD, and PD ≥ PFA, where PD is the probability of detection.
A detector can always achieve PD = PFA by ignoring the input data and flipping a coin with
probability of heads being PD, and declaring a detection when it is heads [10]. Hence any
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algorithm the detector uses should be able to achieve PD ≥ PFA. Additionally, if PD < PFA,
then the detector can simply switch what they declare a detection and a non-event.






























Worst Performance, ε close
Figure 2: Dave’s receiver operating characteristic curves, where best and worst are with
respect to Dave.
We can draw this notion of ϵ closeness on a receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve. In Fig. 2 we’ve graphed the detector’s probability of detection for any given prob-
ability of false alarm. The best and worst cases depicted are from Dave’s perspective. His
absolute best case performance achieves a 100% chance of detecting Alice for any PFA. Of
course, in the real world, he can’t actually achieve this, but a realistic best case would be
the dotted curve in green, where there’s a rapid rise in PD as PFA increases from 0 until
PD hits 1. In the worst case, Dave ignores the data and flips coins instead, achieving the
black dashed line of PD = PFA. A realistic scenario for Dave is that of the dashed red
curve. Dave would like to push this curve out to the upper left corner, where he would have
a very large PD for any PFA. Conversely, Alice would like to force Dave’s ROC curve to
the black dashed line. Practically, Alice can’t push Dave’s performance that low, but aims
to make his curve ϵ close to the worst case (only ϵ greater). In other words, Alice wants
5
PD < PFA + ϵ, which follows from (3).
This ϵ parameter is Alice’s notion of outage, which is analogous to how power con-
strained capacity denotes outage in terms of probability of error.
1.2.3 Theoretical Privacy Capacity
It is possible to bound ξ by bounding the total variation distance between P0(x) and P1(x),
defined as
||P1 − P0||1 =
∫
|P1(x) − P0(x)|dx. (4)
Under the optimal detector for distinguishing P1(x) from P0(x) [11, Ch. 13],
ξ = 1 − 1
2
||P1 − P0||1. (5)
Hence, if we force ||P1 − P0|| < 2ϵ, then Dave’s ξ > 1 − ϵ.
1.3 Practical Privacy Rate
Recall that the capacity of an AWGN channel is actually a maximization problem solving
for the optimal input distribution while keeping the probability of transmission error less
than ϵ. Similarly, to find the privacy capacity under noise uncertainty, we would have to
find the input distribution that maximizes the rate of information between Alice and Bob
while still keeping ξ > 1 − ϵ. We leave this as an open problem, as the challenge is that
for each input distribution Alice could choose, there is a corresponding optimal detector
for Dave. A brute force search over all possible input distributions is infeasible as there
are infinitely many possible input distributions; to find the optimal input distribution would
require a different analytical approach.










x[n]∗x[n] > γ, (6)
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where γ is the detection threshold of Dave’s choosing and N is the number of samples.
The capacity of an AWGN channel is maximized with a Gaussian input distribution, and
the optimal detector for a Gaussian input is a radiometer, so we assume Gaussian signaling
for Alice. Under these constraints, we are no longer solving for Cpr and instead are solving
for an achievable privacy rate Rpr. This particular Rpr is a lower bound of Cpr, as it is an
achievable privacy rate with the choice of a particular input distribution (Gaussian) and the
optimal detector for that distribution (a radiometer). It is possible that there exists some
other input distribution and it’s corresponding optimal detector that will result in a higher
privacy rate.
The Gaussian input signal is in actuality a shared secret between Alice and Bob. In
a traditional AWGN channel without privacy constraints, we know that this achieves and
doesn’t exceed capacity [12, p. 200].
1.4 SNR Wall
We furthermore assume that Dave is uncertain of his noise power—that is, he only knows
his noise Γ̂d is contained to an interval I = [A, B]. In this scenario, Tandra and Sahai showed
that robust detection of Alice is impossible [6], even if Dave takes an infinite number of














γ − Γs − Γ̂d√
2
N (̂Γd + Γs)

, (8)
where they have used the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) on the chi square distribution of the
test statistic. From this they conclude that Dave cannot detect Alice if she transmits below
the SNR wall of B−A
Γd
. By maximizing PFA and PMD independently, Dave’s true performance
is no worse, and with probability 1 better, than if he did not maximize over I. If Dave were
to instead just assume one value of Γ̂d ∈ I, then with probability 1, Dave’s assumption
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about Γ̂d is incorrect, and his PMD and PFA will be higher than what he calculates.
In Tandra and Sahai’s work, when PFA and PMD are maximized independently, B max-
imizes (7) and A maximizes (8). Because it is obviously impossible for Γ̂d to be A and
B simultaneously, Dave’s detection performance can be improved and remain robust. We





PFA(̂Γd, γ) + PMD(̂Γd, γ′). (9)
Dave performs a min max—for any fixed threshold γ, he has to maximize ξ′ over the
uncertainty interval for robustness. But he is free to choose any threshold γ, and hence
minimizes over his choice of γ to improve detection performance. While we are primarily
concerned with this min max, which considers his worst case performance, He. et al studies
the implications of taking into account the distribution of noise uncertainty [13].
While in this thesis we only consider that Dave is uncertain about his noise power,
Che et. al derive the channel capacity when none of Alice, Bob, or Dave know the noise of
both the binary symmetric Alice-Bob channel and the noisier binary symmetric Alice-Dave
channel [14].
1.5 Other Means to Overcome the Square Root Law
While in this thesis we only examine exploiting noise power uncertainty to transmit more
than O(
√
n) bits in n channel uses, there are other means. For example, Dave’s ignorance of
when Alice transmits allows her to transmit O(min(
√
n log(T (n)), n) bits in n channel uses,
where T (n) is the number of time slots each containing n symbol periods, and Alice may use
only a single slot [15]. Another method is the presence of a friendly uninformed jammer,
which allows Alice to transmit O(n) bits in n channel uses, thereby achieving a positive
rate [16, 17, 18]. A third method is to consider a different channel type not subject to the
square root law, such as a continuous time, infinite-bandwidth Poisson channel without a
peak power constraint. The privacy capacity of such a channel is infinite [19].
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CHAPTER 2
SISO PRIVACY RATE WITH MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY
This chapter examines privacy rate for SISO AWGN and Rayleigh channels. Both CSI and
CDI are considered for Rayleigh channels.
2.1 AWGN Channel Privacy Rate with Measurement Uncertainty
As is well known, Alice can transmit at a rate of log2(1+Γs/Γr) bits per channel use over a
AWGN channel when her transmit power is constrained to Γs and Bob’s noise power is Γr









where ξ′(N,Γs) is the sum of PFA and PMD after N observations. By maximizing Γs we
are maximizing Alice’s rate, but we limit ourselves only to the situations where Dave’s ξ′
approaches 1 as he approaches an infinite number of samples.
2.1.1 Privacy Rate
First we need to establish our PFA and PD:





























0, if γ > Γ̂d















where Qχ22N is the tail probability of a chi square distribution of 2N samples, and for some
choice of Γ̂d ∈ [A, B]. We want to maximize Alice’s signal power while forcing ξ → 1, so
we can either force PD → 0 or PFA → 1. To do this we need to satisfy
γ < Γ̂d (15)
or




for all γ and some Γ̂d ∈ [A, B] while maximizing Γs. For γ < B, we can choose Γ̂d = B to




Γs < B − A. (17)
Hence, the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) wall to force ξ → 1 is
Γs = rαd (B − A)/ψ. (18)



















2.1.2 Lower Bound on SNR Wall
Alice can communicate with a positive rate given by (19) while forcing Dave’s detector’s
PD → 0 or PFA → 1 so long as she talks below the SNR wall in (18). Unfortunately, Alice
10
does not know what Dave’s uncertainty is, so Alice cannot know with certainty if she is
communicating just below the SNR wall to maximize her rate. However, she can lower
bound all of the SNR wall parameters under some assumptions.
In most situations there is at least some area in which Alice can be certain that there
is no eavesdropper, such as her immediate vicinity or her building. She can use this to
lower bound rd. Dave’s noise level depends on the temperature, so Alice can also lower
bound B − A by assuming a temperature uncertainty that is less than what is available in
highly-accurate thermometers. The noise level Γd can also be lower bounded by assuming
a temperature in Dave’s receiver and some noise figure. The path loss exponent α can be
lower bounded as well based on the propagation environment characteristics.
With these lower bounds, Alice can achieve private communication—that is, she can









. Numerical results are discussed in Chapter 5.
Goeckel et. al examine the implications when Dave has the full collection of chan-
nel observations, instead of abstracting Dave’s error to the noise level only being known
between A and B [20]
2.2 Rayleigh Fading Channel Privacy Rate with Measurement Uncer-
tainty
Privacy rate can be applied to other channels as well. Here we examine how Rayleigh
fading, under both CSI and CDI, affects our privacy rate.
2.2.1 Problem Statement
We can also apply similar analysis to Rayleigh fading channels with complex valued sym-
bols as depicted in Fig. 3. All other aspects of the scenario are the same as the AWGN





















Figure 3: System block diagram.
For detection the two hypotheses are:
H0 : x[n] = d[n] (20)




Hd s[n] + d[n]. (21)
When Alice has CSI for the Alice-Dave channel, Dave and Alice’s objectives are the
same as the AWGN case. We use the same strategy to analyze the privacy rate in this
scenario. This is an unlikely scenario in practice because Dave and Alice do not cooperate
in any way, but the resulting privacy rate gives us an idea of the best case privacy rate Alice
can hope to achieve.
When Alice only has CDI for the Alice-Dave channel, Dave’s objective is the same as
the AWGN case. However, Alice can no longer guarantee that ξ′ → 1 because she will
not know the instantaneous value of the channel fade. Accordingly, we have to change the
constraint in the privacy rate definition to be E[limN→∞ ξ′(Γs,N)] > 1 − ϵ.
2.2.2 Privacy Rate Under Alice-Dave CSI
Under CSI with a static channel gain, the channel is still characterized as a AWGN channel
with a known scalar multiplier, so we assume Gaussian signaling for Alice. Dave uses
the same detection test as the AWGN case and hence the same detection threshold. The
12
probability of detection is now









We quickly see that aside from the addition of a new scale factor |Hd|2 everywhere there
is ψrαd , our equations for the Rayleigh fading CSI case will be the same as the AWGN case.






















Assuming Hd ∼ CN(0,Γhd) and Hr ∼ CN(0,Γhr), we have







































= DD−1 log2(D), (26)









We can also find the outage rate
Pr(Rpr < c) = Pr
(






(2c − 1) + D (27)
as shown in Figure 4.
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2.2.3 Analysis of Privacy Rate under CSI
Alice can communicate with a positive rate and ξ arbitrarily close to 1 so long as she talks
below the SNR wall in (23). If we compare the privacy rates of the Rayleigh fading and
AWGN channels,






we can see that if the channel gains have identical distributions, then the probability that the
Rayleigh fading channel under CSI has a greater privacy rate than the AWGN channel is
actually one half. There is a small probability that the channel gain ratio will be very large
in Alice’s favor, and this causes the ergodic privacy rate under CSI to increase over the
rate of the AWGN channel. This phenomenon is similar to what occurs in physical layer
security - by sending at a high rate when the channel is in Alice’s favor, Alice can achieve
a higher ergodic secrecy capacity under fading channels than under a AWGN channel [21].
A plot of the outage rate can be found in Fig. 4. We discuss numerical results are discussed
in Chapter 5.
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2.2.4 Privacy Rate under Alice-Dave CDI
Next we study the privacy rate when only CDI is known about the Alice-Dave channel. We
still assume CSI for the Alice-Bob channel. We assume that Alice’s signal is uncorrelated
with the channel gain to Dave: E[s[n]∗Hd] = 0 ∀n. Otherwise the system setup is the same
as the CSI case. However, Alice can no longer guarantee that ξ′ → 1 because she no longer
knows the exact value of Hd when she transmits. Hence, we have to modify our definition










































When we analyze ξ′ we can see that the worst case scenario for Alice is when Dave
picks γ = B, which maximizes PD. For any γ < B, we choose Γ̂d = B. Hence to have
limN→∞ E[ξ′(N,Γs)] ≥ 1 − ϵ , we need







 ≥ 1 − ϵ. (31)









Assuming CSI on the Alice-Bob channel, we have




















































(ϵ) . The derivation of the integral can be
found in the appendix.
We can also find the outage rate
Pr(R̃pr,ϵ ≤ c) = Pr
(




= 1 − Qχ22
(




2.2.5 Comparison of Privacy Rates Under Different Channels
A plot of the privacy rates can be found in Fig. 5 with all parameter ratios set to one (that is,
Γhr
Γhd
= rrrd = 1). As we previously observed, the ergodic privacy rate of a Rayleigh channel
under CSI is greater than that of a AWGN channel because of the small probability of
having a channel gain ratio in Alice’s favor. We also observe that the ergodic privacy rate
for a Rayleigh channel under CDI is lower than that of an AWGN channel, with only small
increases in privacy rate for orders of magnitude increases in ϵ.
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(Ergodic) Rate vs B−A
Γr
for Fading and Nonfading Channels
Nonfading
Fading with CSI
Fading with CDI: ϵ=0.001
Fading with CDI: ϵ=0.01
Fading with CDI: ϵ=0.1
Figure 5: Comparison of Rate or Ergodic Rate vs B−A
Γr
. All parameter ratios are 1. The
ergodic rate under CDI increases with ϵ.
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CHAPTER 3
MIMO RAYLEIGH PRIVACY RATE
We also extend our results to MIMO Rayleigh fading channels with complex valued sym-




nt × 1 X
[H]ij[B]ij
(nr × nt)















+d[n] ∼ CN(0,Γd) Dave
Figure 6: The circle multiplication symbols denote matrix multiplication.
Let a bolded quantity represent a vector or matrix. Let CN(µ,Ξ) denote a vector of cir-
cularly symmetric complex jointly Gaussian random variables with mean µ and covariance
matrix Ξ. Let nt and nr denote the number of transmit and receive antennas, respectively.
Let the [v]i operator be the ith entry of a vector v, and let the [M]i j operator be the row
i, column j entry of a matrix M. Let H denote the set of all variances of the matrix H,
with Var([H]i j) = H(i, j). Let the diag operator denote a diagonal matrix with the diagonal
entries given by the argument.
Alice sends signal s[n] at time index n. Bob and Dave experience noise r[n] and d[n],
respectively. Bob’s jth antenna is located [rr]i j away from Alice’s ith antenna, and Dave’s
antenna is located [rd]i away from Alice’s ith antenna. Bob and Dave experience channel
gains H and G, respectively. We denote the diagonal entries of Q, the covariance matrix of
our signal s[n], as S(i). For simplicity, the channel gains H and G are assumed to be static
18
over the signaling period.
Dave’s detection hypotheses are
H0 : x[n] = d[n] (35)






[G]i[s[n]]i + d[n]. (36)
Alice’s objective is to find the maximum error-free rate at which she can communicate to
Bob while forcing ξ ≥ 1 − ϵ.
3.1 Privacy Rate under Alice-Dave Channel Distribution Information
(CDI)




































0, γ′ > Γ̂d



















For Dave to robustly detect Alice he should choose the γ′ that maximizes ξ′. Forcing
ξ′ → 1 is equivalent to forcing PD → 0 for Γ̂d = B [22]. However, we can only lower







|[G]i|2S(i) < B − A
 ≥ 1 − ϵ. (40)
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Ideally we would use a generalized chi square distribution (the |[G]i|2 are χ22 distributed)
and calculate the set S that satisfies (40). However, we are unable to find an analytical
solution. Instead, we use the Lyapunov Central Limit Theorem (LCLT) for an approximate
analytical solution (see Chapter 3.1.1), and also compute the constraint numerically (see
Chapter 3.1.2).
Once we have the set of valid power allocations,
Rpr = max
Q: S satisfies (40), [Q]ii≤S (i) ∀i,Q positive semidefinite
log2 |I +HQHH |. (41)
3.1.1 Analytic Solution to Privacy Rate under Alice-Dave CDI
For this solution we assume [rd]i = rd, [G]i = Γg,R(i) = Γr, [rr]i j = rr,H(i, j) = Γh ∀i, j.
These parameter uniformity assumptions allow us to use the Marchenko-Pastur (MP) law
[23]. We also assume nt = nr = ñ, but these results can be generalized to nt , nr.
We use the LCLT, which unlike the classical CLT allows for the random variables to not
be identically distributed but requires some extra bounds on their means and variances. The
LCLT allows us to avoid the problem of using the inverse tail of a generalized chi square
distribution Q−1
χ22;S
(·), where the function itself depends on S, the values we are trying to














≤ B − A. (42)
At first glance this equation seems like a solution to bypass the difficulty of an analytical
solution. However, the application of the LCLT in this instance assumed that ñ, the number
of Alice’s (and Bob’s) antennas, approaches infinity. Additionally, we have assumed that all
of Alice’s antennas are equidistant to Dave. This would require that all of Alice’s antennas
be placed on a circle (or sphere), with the center at Dave. However, we will see in Chapter
3.1.2 that the combination of the LCLT’s ñ→ ∞ assumption with the following constraint
results in a good approximation of privacy rate.
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giving us the new constraint function
nt∑
i=1
S(i) ≤ B − A
(1 + Q−1(ϵ)) ψrαd Γg
. (44)
To understand (43), observe that the unit ball described by setting the right hand side (RHS)
of (43) to one is a strict subset of the unit ball described by setting the left hand side of (43)
to one. Hence by using the RHS, we have restricted the valid set of power allocations that
we are maximizing over.
From this point forward we use the MP distribution. The MP law tells us the distribution
of the eigenvalues of a matrix JJH when [J]i j ∼ CN(0, 1) [23]. The parameter uniformity
assumptions allow us to write our new channel matrix H̃ =
√
ΓhJJH. If the distribution of
the eigenvalues for the general H were known, that distribution could be used.
If we take the singular value decomposition (SVD) of H̃ =
√
ΓhUΣVH where Σ =
diag(σi) and let Q = VSVH where S = diag(S(i)Γr ) then our privacy rate approximation is
Rpr,CLT = max










where σ2i = λi are the eigenvalues of JJ
H. Our numerical solution in 3.1.2 considers the off
diagonal elements of Q.




















































Ergodic Rate vs B−A
Γr
for Rayleigh Fading Channels with the LCLT
SISO, ϵ = 0.1
N=3, ϵ = 0.1
N=5, ϵ = 0.1
N=7, ϵ = 0.1
SISO, ϵ = 0.01
N=3, ϵ = 0.01
N=5, ϵ = 0.01
N=7, ϵ = 0.01
SISO, ϵ = 0.001
N=3, ϵ = 0.001
N=5, ϵ = 0.001
N=7, ϵ = 0.001
Figure 7: Privacy rates vs B−A
Γr
under the LCLT model. Rates increase with ϵ and number
of antennas
The familiar water filling solution follows from the fact that applying the LCLT and
(43) changes our constraint function (44) to a total power constraint.
While the eigenvalue distribution of H̃ converges asymptotically with the number of












we get an analytical approximation of the privacy rate. The complete equations are not
particularly insightful but have been included in the appendix.
If nt , nr, the rate bound can be found numerically by evaluating (15) in [23]. The
privacy rates are plotted in Fig. 7 for 1, 3, 5, and 7 antennas, with ϵ = 0.001, 0.01, and 0.1.
This privacy rate differs to that found in [24], which also analyzed a MIMO setup be-









where λi are the eigenvalues
of HHH and µ is a water-filling parameter. However, the low probability of detection (LPD)
constraint in [24] is different from ours, instead constraining the Chernoff exponent, which
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limits how quickly Dave’s detection errors decay exponentially to zero. This Chernoff ex-
ponent constraint acknowledges that while Dave’s detection will be asymptotically perfect
with noise power certainty, it is still possible to transmit a finite amount of data with a
reasonably high ξ for Dave. Our result differs because we assume noise power uncertainty
and a radiometer for Dave.
3.1.2 Numerical Solution to Privacy Rate under Alice-Dave CDI
Again, we are interested in maximizing Alice’s rate under the constraint given by (40).
By using the generalized χ22 distribution [25], we plot valid power allocations for arbitrary
values of ψ, B−A
Γr
,G,Γd and rd, with ñ = 3.
Because the rate monotonically increases with power, we are only interested in power
allocations at the boundary of our constraint function. The discrete points in Fig. 8 come
from (40), whereas the surface plot is that of an ellipsoid, as ( xS(1) )
2 + ( yS(2) )
2 + ( zS(3) )
2 = 1,




(ϵ)G(i)/2 , the maximum power allowed for
that antenna if only that antenna were used [22]. The model match can be evaluated by
calculating the average of ( xS(1) )
2 + ( yS(2) )
2 + ( zS(3) )
2, which is approximately 0.9 for the
plotted values and for thirty other sets of arbitrarily chosen parameters. Additionally, all
the points are strictly interior to the corresponding ellipsoid. As a side note, consider that
the constraint surface for total power-constrained MIMO is a plane in the first hyperoctant.
When just accounting for thermal noise, we have a low resultant transmit power, as
we will see in Chapter 5. Under the traditional sum power constraint, maximizing MIMO
capacity at low SNR involves beamforming. The optimal beamforming covariance matrix
is Q = PvvH, where P is the power constraint and v is the right singular vector of H that
corresponds to its largest singular value. We can employ this same method for the MIMO
privacy rate. However it is important to note that while precoding with the right singular
vectors is optimal under the sum power constraint, it is not optimal under a per-antenna
power constraint [26]. Finding the privacy rate can be reformulated as finding the maximum
of the capacities with per-antenna power constraints for each valid power allocation in Fig.
23
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Surface of Valid Power Allocations
Figure 8: Boundary surface of valid power allocations for arbitrary ψ, B−A
Γr
, ϵ, ρ, Γg, rd. All
points below the surface in the first octant are also valid. The discrete points are the true
boundary, whereas the background surface is an ellipsoid.
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8. The advantage of using the right singular vectors is that it is computationally inexpensive
- it only involves finding the SVD of H and then scaling the vector out to the boundary of the
valid power allocation surface. Additionally, the beamforming approach does not require
the parameter uniformity assumptions, unlike the LCLT approach.
By using only one eigenchannel and sending only one symbol x ∼ CN(0, σ2x), we
precode x̂ = vx. Defining Γs = (S(1),S(2), . . . ,S(nt))T , our power allocation is Γs = σ2xṽ,
where ṽ is the vector such that [ṽ]i = |[v]i|2. We find the scalar σ2x such that Γs is at
the boundary of the set of valid power allocations. Having found σ2x and λ1, the largest
eigenvalue of HHH,




We then use a Monte-Carlo simulation to find the ergodic rate. Additionally, we do
a brute force search to find the true ergodic privacy rate. In our Monte Carlo simulation,
for every realization of H we discretize the space of valid power allocations, calculate the
per antenna power constrained (PAPC) capacity at each allocation [26], and then pick the
maximum across all power allocations. Because calculating the PAPC capacity is computa-
tionally expensive at low power allocations [26], we also present a lower bound which sets
the channel covariance matrix as the diagonal matrix with the per antenna power constraints
along the diagonal.
We compare the LCLT, beamforming, grid search, and grid search lower bound meth-
ods under the parameter uniformity assumptions (as required by the LCLT) in Fig. 9. We
see that at 3 antennas the computationally fast LCLT method provides a good approxima-
tion of the privacy rate. However, we see increasing the number of antennas increases the
error in the LCLT approximation. There are three factors affecting the error approximation:
the use of the LCLT which assumes ñ → ∞, the use of the MP law which also assumes
ñ→ ∞ but converges quite rapidly, and the use of inequality (43). All three factors together
combine to result in an approximation that lower bounds the true privacy rate, and becomes
worse as the number of antennas increases.
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Grid Search Lower Bound, ñ=3
Beamforming, ñ=3
Figure 9: Comparison of privacy rates vs B−A
Γr
under different models



















MIMO Privacy Rate vs B−A
Γr
Grid Search, rd = [5 5 5]
CLT
Beamforming, rd = [5 5 5]
Grid Search, rd = [2 5 5]
Beamforming, rd = [2 5 5]
Figure 10: Privacy rates vs B−A
Γr
. in skewed vs not skewed
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The beamforming solution performs well with parameter uniformity, but as the privacy
constraint region becomes skewed, the approximation error grows (Fig. 10). With pa-
rameter uniformity, the privacy constraint region is symmetric and represents the best case
scenario for the beamforming solution, allowing it to perform well despite using only one
eigenchannel and the wrong precoding matrix.
We can apply all these results to look at some hypothetical numbers on privacy rates.
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CHAPTER 4
DAVE’S OPTIMAL NUMBER OF SAMPLES
In most detection problems we assume that the detector should take as many samples as
possible. This chapter will examine is this is still the case if the noise power is uncertain.
4.1 Worst case scenario
So far we have assumed that Dave’s detection performance increases with the number of
samples he takes, despite being forced to have ξ′ > 1 − ϵ [22]. We showed that asymp-
totically, Dave’s ξ′ is either 0 or 1, depending on Alice’s transmit power. However, the
assumption that more samples is better is actually incorrect, given constraint (9). To see
















We can plainly see that because ψrαd Γs > 0, ξ
′ > 0 at N = 1. Also, ξ′ < 1 because an
exponential with a negative exponent must be less than 1. However, we showed that at an
infinite number of samples, Dave’s ξ′ = 1, provided Alice’s transmit power is low enough.
Because ξ′ is a continuous function over N, there must exist some finite N where ξ′ is








PFA(̂Γd, γ′,N) + PMD(̂Γd, γ′,N)
]
. (51)
This result initially seems counterintuitive. In any detection scenario, the detector is at
worst no better off, and almost always better off by gathering more samples. In this sce-
nario, the detector is actually better off ignoring samples past the optimal number (or just
collecting that many samples in the first place). However, if we look at (51), we see that
Dave is trying to account for the worst case scenario when he maximizes Γ̂d over I. As
Dave collects more samples, there is a chance that he will observe a rare event that repre-
sents his worst case. Because his test statistic is cumulative, he will eventually accumulate
28




















Figure 11: PDFs of test statistics at finite (top graph) and infinite (bottom graph) samples.
The dotted PDFs are those at the lower end of the uncertainty interval.
enough rare events that decrease his detection performance.
Another way to analyze this situation is with the test statistic probability density func-
tion (pdf)’s themselves.
At a large number of samples, by the CLT, the pdf of the test statistic under each
hypothesis converges to a Gaussian distribution, and with an infinite number of samples
the Gaussian distribution converges to a delta function at the mean of the distribution.
The red deltas in Figure 11 represent the null hypothesis of Alice not transmitting. H0,l
represents the null hypothesis pdf with Γ̂d = A, and H0,u represents the null hypothesis
pdf with Γ̂d = B. Conversely, the blue deltas represent the alternate hypothesis that Alice
is transmitting, with H1,l representing the alternate hypothesis pdf with Γ̂d = A, and H1,u
representing the alternate hypothesis pdf with Γ̂d = B.
If Dave considers any detection threshold less than H0,U , such as γ1, by the robustness
criterion in (51), he chooses Γ̂d = B. This means the PDFs of his test statistic are H0,U and
H1,U , implying he will have 100% false alarms. If Dave considers any detection threshold
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greater than H1,L, such as γ2, by the robustness criterion in (51), he chooses Γ̂d = A. This
means the PDFs of his test statistic are H0,L and H1,L, implying that he will have 100%
misses. Thanks to Alice’s power constraint in (17) here does not exist a threshold that
Dave can choose that will allow his asymptotic ξ to be less than 1, and hence it would seem
that Alice can communicate while forcing Dave’s ξ′′ to asymptotically approach 1.
However, if we analyze the finite sample case, we see that the assumption that Dave
should take as many samples as possible is not valid. For simplicity we have assumed
enough samples for the CLT to be valid, but the results hold if we use the true chi square
distribution instead.
The strategy employed in the infinite sample case no longer works because the PDFs
now have a support that is not infinitesimal. Dave can choose any detection threshold he
desires, as long as he satisfies the robustness criterion in (51). Dave could choose the
threshold γ1, in which case there is no choice of Γ̂d and the corresponding PDFs that will
force his ξ′′′ to be arbitrarily close to 1. From Fig. 11, with γ1 as Dave’s choice of detection
threshold, his worst case ξ over the choice of Γ̂d would be on the order of 15%. Previously,
for any choice of γ for Dave, the worst case ξ′′ was asymptotically 1.
In order for Dave to actually compute the optimal N, γ′, and Γ̂d in (51), Dave needs to
know Alice’s Γs. Because we are assuming that Alice and Dave are not cooperative, it is
not realistic to assume that Dave has this information. However, if Alice assumes that Dave
knows Γs, then Alice will be assuming the best case detection performance for Dave under
the constraints he is given, and Alice will be guaranteed to communicate with privacy.
As we can see in Fig. 12, there is a dramatic decrease in privacy rate when we assume
Dave uses the optimal number of samples. This is the robust assumption to take, because
if Dave doesn’t use the optimal number of samples, Alice could transmit with more power.
However, the fact that private communication is even possible, given our assumptions, is
of great significance.
The optimal number of samples decreases as B−A
Γr
increases, as seen in Fig. 13.
30






















for Finite and Infinite Samples
Infinite N
Finite N, ϵ = .001
Finite N, ϵ = .01
Finite N, ϵ = .1
Figure 12: Rate vs B−A
Γr
for finite and infinite samples. Rate increases with ϵ


























Figure 13: Alice’s privacy rate assuming the optimal number of samples for Dave. ϵ has
little effect. Rate becomes difficult to compute at low values of B−A
Γr
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Number of Samples (Thousands)
ξ
ξ under Average Case Noise Uncertainty
Figure 14: Sum of detection error probabilities for the average case, vs number of samples
4.2 Average Case Scenario
The intuition behind why more samples isn’t always better for Dave in the previous scenario
was that he was maximizing his worst case for robustness. So if instead, Dave targeted the
average case, intuition would be that we would return to the standard situation of more
samples is better, or at the very least, not worse. And in fact, we see that this is the case.









PFA(̂Γd, γ′,N) + PMD(̂Γd, γ′,N)
]
f̂Γd (̂Γd)dΓ̂d (52)
where f̂Γd is the pdf of Γ̂d. Assuming a uniform distribution on Γ̂d, we can see in Fig. 14
that ξ′′ decreases monotonically with respect to N, assuming that the optimal threshold γ′opt
has been chosen.
This scenario is not entirely realistic because we are assuming that Dave has knowledge
about f̂Γd , and more importantly that he is not trying to be robust about his detection method.
This detection metric would allow for his calculated ξ′′ to be not be his true sum of detection
errors because Γ̂d is only going to be one value in I. However, analyzing this scenario
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does provide some more intuition for the initially counterintuitive result for the worst case
scenario.
4.3 Further Extension of Finite Sample Results
We leave this finite sample analysis as an open problem for the other types of channels
we consider: SISO and MIMO Rayleigh channels. While we didn’t conduct the finite
sample analysis on such channels, the fact that we can overcome the square root law in
[4] by assuming noise uncertainty, radiometer use, and Dave’s taking of a finite number of




One concern in achieving these rates in practice is that Alice will not be certain of where
the SNR wall is, especially under the Rayleigh fading case as the SNR wall is random. To
give some practical rates we can assume some reasonable lower bounds.
For the non-fading case let us assume Dave is at least 5 meters away because she can
see at least 5m in her immediate vicinity that there are no eavesdroppers. We adopt a free
space propagation model with isotropic antennas. The measurement uncertainty can be
lower bounded by Dave’s temperature uncertainty. Thermal noise power can be written as
Γd = kBT̂ B, (53)
where kB is Boltzman’s constant, T̂ is an uncertain temperature in Kelvin in the range
[TA,TB] and B is bandwidth. An accurate thermometer provides readings within 0.015 K
at 298 K [27]. For propagation loss, we will adopt a free space propagation model, which
sets α = 2. Using these values Alice can compute a worst case SNR wall. For her privacy
rate, we will assume that the noise power in the Alice-Dave channel and the Alice-Bob
channel are the same. We will also assume that Alice knows her distance to Bob. For the
transmission frequency we will assume Alice is transmitting at 900 MHz. Finally, Alice
needs to know a lower bound on Γd, so she will take the lower end of the uncertainty range
for thermal noise power. These values are summarized in Table 1.
Table 2 gives the MIMO and SISO rates for the common bandwidths of 1, 10, and 20
MHz. For the MIMO case, we assume three antennas at each of Alice and Bob, we use the
parameter uniformity assumptions so all of Alice’s antennas are the same distance away
from Dave’s antennas, and we assume all the noise variances on the channels from Alice
to Dave are the same. While these bitrates found in Table 2 are low, if Alice can obtain
better estimates of the noise uncertainty by taking into account interference sources or other
factors, this privacy rate can increase.
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Table 1: Assumed values
True Temperature (T ) 298 K
Temperature Range 297.985 K - 298.015 K
Detector Distance (rd) 5 meters
Receiver Distance (rr) 20 meters
Propagation Parameter (α) 2
Alice-Dave Noise Power Alice-Bob Noise power
Wavelength 333 mm
Table 2: Privacy Rates
Bandwidth MIMO Rpr SISO Rpr
1 MHz 98.1 bits/s 9.07 bit/s
10 MHz 981.2 bits/s 90.7 bit/s
20 MHz 1962.3 bits/s 181.4 bits/s
The MIMO privacy rates are 2.7 times greater than having four individual SISO chan-
nels. It is important to remember that the search space for power allocation is not a plane
like the standard total power constrained capacity problem—the search space is ellipsoidal
in nature, as we see in Fig. 8. This non-planar shape allows us to increase our capacity by
a factor beyond the number of antennas.
If Bob gets closer to Alice, the private rate can increase dramatically, as shown in Fig.
15. We previously saw in Fig 7 that we can also increase the privacy rate if Dave’s noise
uncertainty were to increase.
5.1 Other Sources of Noise Uncertainty
Up to this point we assumed that Dave’s noise uncertainty is not affected by Alice’s be-
havior. However, Alice could set up interference sources that turn on and off at random
intervals. This interference can create more noise uncertainty for Dave and increase Al-
ice’s privacy rate. Also, because Alice set up the interference sources herself, she can
estimate Dave’s uncertainty from these sources.
Additionally, there can be other noise sources present that are not in collusion with
Alice. In the extreme underlay scenario, the primary user could be seen as an interference
35


























Figure 15: Privacy rates vs Alice-Bob distance.
source that increases Dave’s noise uncertainty. However, Bob has to be able to reject the
noise for this to increase his rate, because otherwise his noise increases as well and offsets
the gain in allowable transmit power.




It is possible to overcome the square root law of private communication if two assumptions
are made: the detector is uncertain of its noise level and the detector uses a radiometer. We
showed that the detector should only take into account a finite number of samples, and that
while the detector cannot actually calculate the optimal number of samples without know-
ing the transmitter’s power, the detector does know that the optimal number of samples
decreases as its uncertainty about the noise increases. Further work would be to analyze
Rayleigh SISO and MIMO channels to confirm that a finite number of samples is optimal
in those cases as well.
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APPENDIX
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The equation for ergodic MIMO capacity as derived in [23] is


































(µ − ar)(br − µ)
2πµr













and a in the large matrix limit asymptotically approaches the root mean square transmit to
receive attenuation.
When r = 1, we have the results
∫ ∞
µcut
dµ f1(µ) =1 −
√




































































[1] A. Goldsmith, S. A. Jafar, I. Maric, and S. Srinvasa, “Breaking spectrum gridlock with
cognitive radios: An information theoretic perspective,” Proceedings of the IEEE,
vol. 97, pp. 894–914, May 2009.
[2] W. Xu, W. Trappe, Y. Zhang, and T. Wood, “The feasibility of launching and de-
tecting jamming attacks in wireless networks,” in Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and
Computing, Proc. of the 6th ACM International Symposium on, pp. 46–57, 2005.
[3] L. Lazos, S. Liu, and M. Krunz, “Mitigating control-channel jamming attacks in
multi-channel ad hoc networks,” in Wireless Network Security, Proc. of the Second
ACM Conference on, pp. 169–180, 2009.
[4] B. Bash, D. Goeckel, and D. Towsley, “Limits of reliable communication with low
probability of detection on AWGN channels,” Selected Areas in Communications,
IEEE Journal on, vol. 31, pp. 1921–1930, September 2013.
[5] J. Fridrich, Steganography in Digital media: Principles, Algorithms, and Applica-
tions. MIT Press, 2 ed., 2001.
[6] R. Tandra and A. Sahai, “SNR walls for signal detection,” Selected Topics in Signal
Processing, IEEE Journal of, vol. 2, pp. 4–17, Feb 2008.
[7] J. Hou and G. Kramer, “Effective secrecy: Reliability, confusion and stealth,” in 2014
IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, pp. 601–605, 2014.
[8] T. Rappaport, Wireless Communications. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall,
2 ed., 2002.
[9] S. Alexander, “Characterising buildings for propagation at 900 MHz,” Electronics
Letters, vol. 19, pp. 860–, September 1983.
[10] K. S, Fundamentals of Statistical Signal Processing Detection Theory. Prentice Hall,
Inc., Upper City River, New Jersey, 2 ed., 1998.
[11] E. Lehmann and J. Romano, Testing Statistical Hypotheses. NY: Springer, 3 ed.,
2005.
[12] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory. John Wiley & Sons,
Hoboken, NJ, 2 ed., 2002.
[13] B. He, S. Yan, X. Zhou, and V. K. N. Lau, “On covert communication with noise
uncertainty,” IEEE Communications Letters, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 941–944, 2017.
40
[14] P. H. Che, M. Bakshi, C. Chan, and S. Jaggi, “Reliable deniable communication
with channel uncertainty,” in 2014 IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW 2014),
pp. 30–34, 2014.
[15] B. A. Bash, D. Goeckel, and D. Towsley, “Covert communication gains from adver-
sary’s ignorance of transmission time,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communica-
tions, vol. 15, no. 12, pp. 8394–8405, 2016.
[16] T. V. Sobers, B. A. Bash, S. Guha, D. Towsley, and D. Goeckel, “Covert commu-
nication in the presence of an uninformed jammer,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless
Communications, vol. 16, no. 9, pp. 6193–6206, 2017.
[17] D. Goeckel, A. Sheikholeslami, T. Sobers, B. A. Bash, O. Towsley, and S. Guha,
“Covert communications in a dynamic interference environment,” in 2018 IEEE 19th
International Workshop on Signal Processing Advances in Wireless Communications
(SPAWC), pp. 1–5, 2018.
[18] T. V. Sobers, B. A. Bash, S. Guha, D. Towsley, and D. Goeckel, “Covert communica-
tions on continuous-time channels in the presence of jamming,” in 2017 51st Asilomar
Conference on Signals, Systems, and Computers, pp. 1697–1701, 2017.
[19] L. Wang, “The continuous-time poisson channel has infinite covert communication
capacity,” in 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT),
pp. 756–760, 2018.
[20] D. Goeckel, B. Bash, S. Guha, and D. Towsley, “Covert communications when the
warden does not know the background noise power,” IEEE Communications Letters,
vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 236–239, 2016.
[21] M. Bloch, J. Barros, M. Rodrigues, and S. McLaughlin, “Wireless information-
theoretic security,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 54, pp. 2515–
2534, June 2008.
[22] S. Lee and R. J. Baxley, “Achieving positive rate with undetectable communication
over AWGN and Rayleigh channels,” in Communications (ICC), 2014 IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on, pp. 780–785, June 2014.
[23] D. Bliss, K. Forsythe, and A. Yegulalp, “MIMO communication capacity using in-
finite dimension random matrix eigenvalue distributions,” in Signals, Systems and
Computers, 2001. Conference Record of the Thirty-Fifth Asilomar Conference on,
vol. 2, pp. 969–974 vol.2, Nov 2001.
[24] A. Hero, “Secure space-time communication,” Information Theory, IEEE Transac-
tions on, vol. 49, pp. 3235–3249, Dec 2003.
[25] D. Hammarwall, M. Bengtsson, and B. Ottersten, “Acquiring partial CSI for spatially
selective transmission by instantaneous channel norm feedback,” Signal Processing,
IEEE Transactions on, vol. 56, pp. 1188–1204, March 2008.
41
[26] M. Vu, “MIMO capacity with per-antenna power constraint,” in Global Telecommu-
nications Conference (GLOBECOM 2011), 2011 IEEE, pp. 1–5, Dec 2011.
[27] ICL Calibration Laboratories, Dostmann D795-PT, 2013.
42
